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ABSTRACT

In this paper. we suggest that maf!.v budget theories actually are abow appropriating and not
about budgeting. IVe trace this development back to the classic budgeting question posed by
VO. Keys in 19·10. To clarifY the issue, we examine early normative theories of budgeting,
and apply many contemporary theories about budgeting to the budgeting process advocated
for in this early work. By analyzing current theories. we show that budget theories are. in
many cases, simply focused on parts ofthe budget process or on the role of techniques in de
cision making. Our analyses suggest that rather than theories competing with each other. a
larger metathe01:v of budgeting emerges that can accommodate these different approaches.
Further. we identify important gaps in the literature that still needs to be addressed for a
complete treatment ofpublic budgeting theory.
11.1. INTRODUCTION

"Nearly every writer on American government has commented adversely
on the fact that appropriations are made by congress each year without a
budget." - Frederick A. C leve land, Chairman - Pres ident's Comm ission on
Economy and Effic iency. 1 9 1 2
I n developing a metatheory of budgeting, the first and most basic, question
is: what is the po int of a theory o f budgeting? V. 0. Key started the d iscussion
by asking, . .On \vhat basis shall we decide to allocate x dollars to activity A
instead of act ivity BT1 He goes on to say, "If it is assumed that an agency is
operating at maximum effic iency, the question remains whether the function is
worth carrying out at all. or whether it should be carried out on a reduced or
enlarged scale. with resulting transfers of funds to or fro m other activities o f
1

V. 0.

Key. Jr., "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory." The American Political Science Review

3-+. no. 6 (1940): 1 1 38.
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2
greater or lesser social utility. · · Thi:; issue has guided much discussion of
budget theory over the past seventy years. Here it is argued that the question
itself is qu ite ambiguous. But an even larger concern is that it may be the
wrong q uestion. For, what is a budget? How is a budget d ist ingu ished from
"mere appropriating?" Here it is argued that Key · s question is not about budg
eting . it is about appropriating, or, more speci fically, that legislative action
that predated budgeting and was intended to be replaced by the dec ision to
budget. If Key has confused appropriating w ith budget ing. then much of the
theory of budgeting itself is actually a theory of appropriating. Perhaps by
framing budget theories not in terms of appropriation but instead as budgeting,
we can more c learly see the relationship bet\veen many o f the theories that
have been propounded over the years and identifY areas where there is no co
herent theory at all.
Table 11.1. Federal Receipts. Expenditures, and Surplus/Deficits, 1890-1916
($in billions)
Year

Receiols

Expenditures

Survlus/Deficil

Surplus/Deficil as % of
Soendin"

0.38

0.08

21.05%

0.02

4.55%
5.00"/o

1890

0.46

1891

0.46

0.44

1892

0.42

0.4

1893

0.46

0.46

0

0.00"/o

1894

0.38

0.44

-0.06

-13.64%

0.02

1895

0.4

0.42

-0.02

-4.76%

1896

0.42

0.44

-4.55%

1897

0.44

0.44

-0.02
0

1898

0.5
0.62

0.54

-0.04

0.7

-0.08

-7.41%
-11.43%

0.66

0 62
0.64

0.06

6.45%
9.37%
13.33%

1899
1900
1901
1902

0.7
0.68

0.00%

0.04

0.6

0.08

0.7
0.68

0.66
0.72

0.04

6.06%

·0.04

-5.56%

0.7
0.76

0.72
0.74

-0.02

1906

0.02

-2.78%
2.70%

1907

0.84

0.76

0.08

10.53%

1908

0.8

0.86

·0.06

-6.98%

1909

0.82

-0.08

1910

0.9

0.9
0.92

-0.02

-8.89%
-2.17%

1903
1904
1905

191 I
1912

0.94
0.9-t

0.92

0.02

2.17%

0.94

0

0.00"/o

1913

0.98

0.98

0

0.()0%

1914

1.02

1.02

0

0.00%
-5.77%

1915

0.98

1.04

1916

1.08

1.04

-0.06
0.04

Total, 1890-1916

18.74

18.74

0

Source: From Morns A. Copeland, "A Further Jllstoncal Rc\1ew,"

111

3.85%
0.00"/o
Trends in Governmenl

Financing, ed. Morris A. Copeland (Ann Arbor, Ml: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1961).

: Ibid . .
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11.2. WHAT IS BUDGETING AND WHAT IS ITS PURPOSE?

th and early 20th Cent u ries, the federal governme n t had no pu b
l ic bud get i n g systems in place. Betw e en 1 890 and 1916 (the year in which the
US entered World War I and s i gnific ant ly increased federal e x pend itures on
I n the late I 9

th is e ffort). the federal gove rnment es sent ially broke even fma nc ia l ly. With i n

th is breakeven period, however, annual sur pluses or defic its were relat ive ly
pronounced and varied. For exam ple wh ile the gove rnment re ported nearly a
fourteen percent deficit in

1894, it sho wed a thirteen percent surplus in 1902.

On the other hand. state and local governments ran i n creasi n gly lar ger defi
c its. Thro u gh

1 9 16, state and local gove rnments r a n o perat in g defic its that av

eraged between t hree and e leven perc ent of annual s pend i n g. 3 Further. whi le

the federal gove rnment 's share of s pend in g relative to gross domestic product
(G OP) was decl i n i n g d urin g this period of t ime , state and local gove rnment
s pendi n g relat ive to GDP

was actually increasin g.

The lack of plan n in g by governme n ts became a c o ncern for re formers dur

in g this t ime. C it ies and states s pent mil l io ns of dollars annually ·'w ith litt le or

no tho u gh t as to where it

was comin g fi·o m or what they were getti n g for it "
was in its '·heyday of ·pork barrel' era. '' 4 As not

wh i le the federal gover nment

ed by C leve land. the ·'u ncontrolled a n d u ncontro llable increase in the cost of
government " demanded that governments ado pt bud get processes to e nsure

democratic trans parency. 5 I n other wor ds . there was a grow i n g sense that the

lack of financial plan n i n g in govern m ent was lead i n g to corru ption that . i n

tu rn, was contributi n g s i gn i ficant ly to these annual de ficits. The process of
bud geti n g - o f systemat ica lly planni n g the finances o f governments - was

viewed

as he l pi n g to e l i m inate these defic it s and seem i n gly u nethical behav

iors of le gis latures ; in other words, i mplement in g bud get i n g processes \vas

expected to create better o utcomes for gove rnments. This notion o f desired
outcomes is at the core o f the public bud getin g traditio n , or it sho uld be.

I n this same tradition. Goodnow argues that bud geti n g is not just a plan for

how money is s pe nt o r a ppro priated. Rather. the first ste p in the bud getin g
6
process is a princ i pa l e x pressing a desired outcome to an a gent. He su ggests

that the pr inc i pa l in this case is the le gisla ture. d u ly e lected by the po pu lation.
3

Morris A. Copeland. "A Further Historical Review." in Trends in Governmelll Financing, ed.
Morris A. Copeland (Ann Arbor, M I : University of Michigan Press. 1961).
� Arthur Eugene Buck, "The Development of the Budget Idea in the United States." The
Annals ofthe American A cademy ofPolitical and Social Science 113. no. M ay ( 1924 ): 81.
5 Frederick Albert Cleveland. " Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States," The Annals
of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 62. no. November (1915).
6 Frank J. Goodnow, "The Limit of Budgetary Control," Proceedings of the American

Political Science Association 9( 1912).
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The budget process's starting point, then, is fundamentally an expression o f
publ ic goals t o agency heads. B u t just as important i s that the agent (public
agency officials) must report back to the principal (the legislature) what was
accomp l ished towards these public goals. Therefore, budgeting is not just
about planning which activit ies of government are funded and by how much
(how much is al located to activity A instead of activity B). but a lso requ ires an
accounting ofvvhether public goals were met or not. Stated in more contempo
rary terms. budgeting requ ires some measure of performance by wh ich public
managers are evaluated. When agents fa il to meet the establ ished and agreed
upon goals. the principals reduce the d iscretion of these agents. This m ight
include red ucing the fu nd ing of the agency, or it m ight mean shifting budget
ing from goals (that is, performance) to l ine- item restrictions. In this under
standing of budget ing. l ine- items remove budgetary d iscretion from the agent.
rather than maintain ing a lump sum performance-based budget. Agents have
an incentive to meet established goals to avoid losing such d iscretion.
Goodnow's description of budgeting - which predates Key by over three
decades - is important because it suggests something that may be lost in the
ambiguity of Key's question. Budget theory should not just explain ho\v mon
ey is d istributed w it h in government, but also why budgets should aid in meet
ing public p lans and goals. I n other words, budget theory ought to explain
more than appropriation decis ions; it should also explain what the establ ished
goals of a government are, how these goals are measured, and how the system
controls operations to meet these goals.
In some respects. this reflects the writ ings of C leveland as \veil. Budgeting
and appropriat ing are different activit ies of government - or perhaps more cor
rectly. budgeting invo lves appropriating, but not only appropriating. For budg
eting certa inly requ ires the appropriat ing of public moneys for specific activi
ties (X versus Y): but barring a means to consider a p lan for publ ic activities.
then government act ivit ies are not budgeted - they are simply financed and
appropriated. Further. a budget requires reporting to account for the ste\vard
ship of publ ic resources. I n do ing so. the budget provides a snapshot of the
government's financial condition . Goodnow and C leveland are. in some re
spects. advocates for a rational model of budgeting. in wh ich goa ls are set. re
sources are allocated to reach these goals, the legis lature approves o f the plan.
and agency officials im p lement the budget plan; results are then compared to
p lan during the year. adj ustments are made (budget modifications), and these
inform the formation of the subsequent budget. However, few would argue
that the rat ional budget model explains or predicts public budgeting in the
least. 7 However. the importance of the theories of Goodno\v and C leveland
rests not in the accuracy of the description of the budgeting process. but in7

Robert D. Lee and Ronald Wayne Johnson. Public budgeting systems. 6th ed. (Gaithersburg.
Md.: Aspen Publishers. 1 998).
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stead as an expansion o f Key · s question regard ing public budget ing. Stated
another way, their theoretical contribution is that any t heory of budgeting
needs to exp lain not just appropriation decisions, but also how goals are set.
measured. and achieved (or why not).
Table 1 1.2 summarizes the work of B uck, C leve land. and Goodnow that
describes who is involved in budget decisions. how goals are set, and ho\v re
sults are measured for determination of success or fai lure. Importantly, these
theories present a normat ive theory or budgeting because they describe a co m
p lete budgetary process. Appropriating decis ions are certainly part of these
processes - described generally in row 3 of Table 2. However. the authors are
quite clear that appropriations and budget ing are not synonymous terms Buck cal ls them · •separate and d istinct documents, although they are often
8
confo unded'': C leve land notes that appropriations routinely occur without a
budget;9 and Goodnow infers that Congress appropriates for specific activities
or objects of expenditures despite lacking budgets. Therefore. where Keys d e
tines budgeting as appropriat ing, earlier theorists noted t he d istinction. Yet,
for nearly a century. a normat ive theory of budgeting (as opposed to mere ap
propriating) has e xisted to guide further theoretical deve lopment.
11.3. POST-KEY BUDGET THEORIES

Two prominent budget theories emerged during the 1 950s. F irst, there is
10
the theory expounded by Verne Lewis:
l . S ince resources are scarce in relation to demands. the basic economic test
which must be appl ied is that the return fro m every expend iture must be worth
its cost in terms o f sacrificed alternatives. Budget analys is. therefore. is bas i
cally a comparison of the relat ive merits of alternative uses of funds.
2. Incremental analys is (that is. analys is of the add it iona l values to be derived
from an add itional expenditure) is necessary because o f the phenomenon of
diminishing ut il ity. Analysis o f the increments is necessary and use fu l only at
or near the margin; t h is is the point of balance at \Vhich an additional expend i
ture for any purpose would yield the same return.
3. Comparison o f relative merits can be made only in terms o f relative effec
tiveness in ach ieving a common objective.
Lewis argues that agencies shou ld produce alternative budgets that show
the effect of marginal changes in the agency' s expenditures - that is. budget
for continuing at the same level and at slightly h igher and lower levels - so
8
9

Buck. "The Development of the Budget Idea in the United States,"
Cleveland, "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States."

10

Verne B. Lewis. "Toward a Theory of Budgeting."

( 1 952): 42.

38.

47.

Public Administration Review 12,

no.

I
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that decision makers can purchase tl)e basket of goods that best reflects their
preferences. Lewis's theory can be classified as rational or even hyper
rational, re lying on the maximum reasoning capacity of both the bureaucrat
and the decis io n maker. L ike the early theories of Buck, C leveland, and
Goodnow, Lewis's theory is a lso normative, because it recommends a process
for participants in the budget process to fo llow. L ike the earlier normative the
ories, therefore, it is not intended to be a description of what actually happens
during budgeting. U n l ike the early theories d iscussed, however, Lewis does
not explicitly cons ider the entire budgetary process of goa l setting and perfo r
mance measurement.
Table I1.2. Normative Thcorv of a Bud!!et 1912 to 1915

I

Responsible executive

leadership

2. Staff assistance

Goodnow-·

Cleveland·

Buck

Plan Must Be Made by a Responsible
E xecutiVe-accountable for the man·

control and of admimstrative efficiency \\111

agement of the affairs of the whole
government

be reconciled if proviston is made for the

many persons The estimate of needs

comprehensive mtelligtble accounts of expendnures and of work done as \\ill permit
the budget making authoril)' to reach an

the eStimates must be made b)' n great
must be made by persons who arc

3

famthar with the requirements of each
work to be done

kmd of
Broad and accurate

Estimates of resources

admmistrative uuthonties of such detailed,

tntelhgent JUdgment both as to efficiency of

admmistration and as to conformity by the
\\ill of the budget makmg authoritv

Complete budget plan

Esumates of needs

\

Character of activtt\' [program

f

el

Object of expenditure accounting cod

S

Building and im·
provement program

6

rendering to the budget making authorit)' by

admmtstrattve authonttes to the expressed

budget information

4

It is believed that the demands of legislative

Open procedure by

rc:sponsrble legislative

body

means of enabling representatiYes to

The question, therefore, presents itself how

inquire mto the requests for future
2rants

may the demands for an effective legislative
control over executive action be satisfied

letting the people know what has been

without sacrificrng administmtive enicien·

done and \\hat ts proposed and of
getung controversies between a ma·

cy' It mav be assumed that this control wtll
be based on the power to make appropria-

Joril)' of repcesentatives and

lions

the exec·

utlve before the electorate for final

I

! 7 A financial calendar
8. Effective control over
the execution of the
budget plan

dectsion
Penod authorized
Budget Control by the Representative

Suppose

Bodv

were not convinced that tts mandates had
been heeded or that the admmistralion had

means of enabling representatives to

the budget making authonl)'

[ W]hat can the budget

find out whether the executive �.as
acted withm his past authori111tions

been effictent

and conducted the business eniciently

ordy two things. These are, first, it may

making authority do? There are practically
specify items of future appropriations in
(cut]
Or. second, tt may

great detatl

down or [refuse] altogether appropnations
until those
for [unsatisfactory] services
persons in charge .

have severed therr

connection \\ith the government.

At the end o f the fift ies, Charles L indblom 14 proposes that pol icy deci
sions are made not through a means-ends reasoning process, but through an
11
1�
13

Buck. "The Development ofthe Budget Idea in the United States."
Cleveland. "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States."
Goodnow, ''The Limit of Budgetary Control."
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iterative e x perient i a l ly corrective process. \Vh ic h he labe ls successive l i m ited

comparison. He asserts that this is the preferable method of po l icy making b e 
cause means-ends reason ing re l ies on theoretica l reason ing. wh ich. for him,
means pred ict ing the consequences of actions w ithout the aid of e x perience

and wh ich , he asserts. peo ple do q u ite poorly. Two other im portant com po 
nents are that ( I) the o bject o f po I icy mak ing i s agreement and

(2) both the

methods and the e nds o f po lic ies are selected in the process of seek ing agree
ment. As pro posed by L indblo m th is is a theory of po l icy making. but Aaron

W ildavsky and c o l leagues ado pted it as a theory of budgeting. 15 L indblo m ' s
view i s essent ia lly an extens ion o f Her bert S imon 's theory of bounded rat io n 
a l ity . 16 S imon argues that decision mak ers have too few resources - particu lar 
ly , they have too l itt le t ime - to make c o m prehensive rat ional dec is io ns as
called for in c lass ic econo m ic theory. L indblom adds that decision makers are

not smart enough to make such dec is io ns - that is. when they rely on theories

about what ha ppe ns without having experience to su pport the theories, they

are l ikely to be wrong.

While L i n d b lo m 's account has a sharply normative flavor . W i ldavsky and

colleagues ado pt the o ut l ines of the theory for desc r i pt ive pur poses. They as
sert that there is too much informat ion to handle i n a budget cyc l e , so dec isio n

makers must ado pt sim pl i fication strate gies for successfu l dec ision making.

Whi le ado pt ing S imo n - l ike reason ing wit h res pect to the lack of resources,

they more c lose ly reflect Lindblom when t hey argue. "There is. however , little

or no theory i n most areas o f po l icy wh i ch would enable pract itioners to pre 
d ict the consequences o f alternative moves and the probab i l ity o f their occur
17
r ing. ''
They ado pt a variant of incr ementa l ism , "Incremental calculatio ns
proceed from an e x ist i ng base . . . . The w ides pread sharing of dee ply held e x 

pectations concern ing the organizat ion 's base provides a po wer ful (although
18
informal) means of securing stabi l it y." They exam ine this form of incremen 

talism w ith regression models, fin din g confirmat ion o f the ir desc r i pt iv e model.

As LeLou p documents. these regress ion models have s ince become d iscredit
1
ed ; 9 as one exam ple. the variables inc l uded in the ana lys is - such as agency

1•

Charles Edward Lindblom. "The Science of "Muddling Through"," Public Administration

Review 19. no. 2 (1959).

15 Aaron B. Wildavsky. The politics of the budgetary process (Boston,: Little. 1964): Otto A.
Davis, M. A. H. Dempster. and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process." The
American Political Science Review 60, no. 3 ( 1966): Aaron B. Wildavsky. "Political
Implications ofBudgetary Refom1." Public Administration Review 2 1 , no. 4 (1961).
16
Herbert Alexander Simon, Administrative behavior: a swdy ofdecision-makingprocesses in
administrative organization. 2d ed. (New York.: Macmillan. 1957).
17 Davis. Dempster. and Aaron Wildavsky. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," 529.
1 8 Ibid. 530
19 Lance T. Leloup, "From Microbudgeting to Macrobudgeting: Evolution in Theory and
Practice." in New Directions in Budget Theory. ed. I rene S. Rubin (Albany: State University
ofNew York Press. 1988).
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budgetary requests and final budgetary appropriations - are genera l ly highly
correlated. leading to the empirical support ofthe theory.
Incremental ism is about as sharply different from Lew is's marginal ut ility
model as two theories can be. I ncrementalism is non-rat ionaL Dec isions do not
depend on the reasoning c apacity of the decision maker. but on steps taken to
simpl i fy the decision process and avoid hard decis io n making. U n l ike L ind
blom's notion of incrementalism - in which incremental changes are recom
mended because of decis ion makers· constraints - W ildavsky's theory of in
crementalism is inherent ly posit ive and describes observed phenomena. Budg
et theory suggests. therefore. that some authors make strong recommendations
for fbture behavior (that is. normat ive theory) while others observe the budg
etary process or actors and describe t hese observations (that is. positive theo
ry). In both cases. however, we describe each as · 'budget theory' · even though
the goals of each type of theory is very distinct: the normative w ishes to rec
ommend good or best practices for part or all of the budgetary process, while
the positive is interested in explain ing what and why part or all o f the budget
ary process happens.
11.4. FROM

NORMATIVE

TO

POSITIVE

IN

HISTORICAL

CONTEXT

This shift from the early normative theories o f Buck. Goodnow, and Cleve
land to the positive theories post-Keys is unsurprising when p laced in h istori
cal context. B udget ing was not formalized at the federal level until 1923. fo )
lowed by states and municipalities en masse. The normative theories argued
that budgeting was critical for democratic government and accountability. Fo l
lowing the sociaL economic, and po lit ical upheavals o f the 1 93 0s and 1 940s.
budget theorists were no longer advocating for budgeting, but were instead
examin ing budget ing - or parts of budgeting - as it existed.
We categorize significant budget theories and theories related to budgetary
issues into several d istinct traditions in Table 3 . Descr iptions o f included
budget theories are found in Appendix A. First. the rows of Table 3 divide
budgetary theories into the ' ·Prescriptive·· and the • ·Posit ive:· Prescriptive the
ories inc lude those that have been described as normative. In add ition. we in
c lude instrumental theories that reflect normative guides but a lso provide rec
ommended methods to achieve the intended results. As an example, zero
based budgeting (ZBB) requires agencies to justify their existence (and spend
20
ing) every budget cycle. In theory, this method requ ires principals ( legis la
tures) to approve of public goals, determine how much should be appropriated
to meet t hese goals. evaluate how agents are accomplishing these goals. and

:o

(Lee and Johnson. 1998)
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hold these agents accountable for their performance. I t is normative in that
recommends behavior. but also provides the method for attaining goals.
In contrast to these prescriptive theories are the positive theories. We dis
t ingu ish between descriptive and explanatory positive theories. Whereas the
descriptive mere ly notes what is observed, explanatory theories also show how
or why some budgetary behavior occurs. For example, the greedy bureaucrat
theory of Niskanen describes bureaucrats who seek to increase their level of
spending: by increasing their d iscretionary budgets. these bureaucrats maxim
ize their own utility (through larger staffs, increased pay, etc.) rather than that
ofthe public. 2 1 This theory seeks to not only describe what is observed (ineffi
cient public spending). but also why this theory occurs in reality.
Existing budget theories are not merely prescriptive or positive. however.
Table 8.3 also considers the role of budget execution in existing budget theory.
We d istingu ish here between the hyper-rational, the rationa� the quasi
rational, the non-rational. and the anti-rational. I n the hyper-rational, the budg
etary tech nique itsel f d ictates the u lt imate budgetary decision. Returning to the
ZBB example, an agency u nable to justifY its ex istence is simply defunded and
ceases to exist. The techn ique (budget justification) l inearly determines the
budgetary decision.
I n contrast, t h e rat ional d i mension largely re l ies on speci fic techniques
(perhaps even recommended techniques); however. these techn iques contrib
ute information to the decision making process of budget ing. but do not make
the determinat ion itself. For example, line item budget ing provides info r
mation on how money is spent within departments. agencies. and organiza
tions. Decision makers may decide to change these amounts. a lter line items.
or both to attain some particular goal. Unlike the hyper-rational. however,
there are no built-in decision criteria and decision m akers must determine such
appropriations ultimately.
The quasi-rational is closely re lated to the rational d i mension: whereas the
rational contributes to budgetary decis ion mak ing, quasi-rat ional provides in
formation to inform the decision. The dec ision makers ( legis lature, executive.
or both) may consider other information as we ll (that may even re ly upon dif-.
ferent techniques). For example. workforce size budgets invo lve agencies jus
tifYing the number o f emp loyees working for the agency. Rather than decision
makers simply determining that a certain number of emp loyees are requ ired to
meet some public goal. this workforce size budget informs the decision maker
a long with other informat ion as we l l (such as cost effect iveness. as one exam
p le).
:I

(1971)
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Table

11.3.

Two Dimensions of Bud2et and Bufl2et-Related Theories

Hyper-

Rational

Qu2si-Rational

Non-Rational

Anti-Rational

Rational
Classic
N

p
R
E

s
c
R
I
p
T
I
v
E

0
R
M
A
T
I
v

Economic

Early Budget
Literature

Man
Marginality

ofB?

Mixed Scanning

Ke}nesianism

Responsibility

Comprehensive

Budgeting

Portfolio
Theory

sions

Executive Budget
Top-

E

DomlfBottom-

Up
I
N
s
T
R
u
M
E
N
T
A

D
E

E

Incrementalism
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Table 11.4. Applvill2 Buck's Bud2ct Theon to Currcntl\ormatin Bud cta11 Theories
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Table ll..ta. Symbols for Tables 4 through 7

../ =present, called for in theory or very strongly i mpl ied

i =implied by the theory. but not strongly
x

= denied by the theory
../• =present, but with limitations, for row:
3, broad or accurate, not both,

4, t h e theory defines complete,

6, legislative process, but not necessarily open
? = Unclear, possibly
P =Partially true
Blank=Unaddressed
See Appendix A for column labels.
Labels in the bottom row are the first letter of column labels from Table 3

The non-rational essential ly starts with a decision and is indifferent to the
techniques used to get there. For example, in the 1 990s, Gramm-Rudman
Hollings (GRH) was a federal effort to reduce deficit spend ing. I f decision
makers (Congress a nd the President) were unable to reduce budgetary deficits
and eventually reach budget balance, then GRH would reduce or cancel cer
tain budgetary expenditures. The goa l (reduced deficit spend ing and. eventua l
ly, a ba lanced budget) was primary for GRH; decision makers were viewed
a lmost as incapable of reaching this goal. Hence, any technique was valid as
long as the end result was in l ine w ith the goal.
Finally, the anti-rational d imension suggests that rational techn iques and
analysis are excluded from or even possibly rejected in the decision making

1 88

Williams & Calabrese

process. Return i ng to the greedy bureaucrat theory. rational techniques might
suggest that an agency's approved spending be reduced to where t he margina l
benefit o f o utput equals the marginal cost o f that output. However, such ra
t ionality is rejected by not only the bureaucrat seeking increased funds, but
decision makers w ho must ultimately approve these fu nds. Perhaps the budget
is set where total benefits equals total cost (which leads to oversupply), or per
haps it is set to some other arbitrary number; the point is that rational analysis
plays no role in the ultimate appropriation decision.
8.5. ARE EXISTING THEORIES REALLY ABOUT BUDGETING, OR
JUST A PARTICULAR ASPECT OF BUDGETING?

As posited earlier in this paper, we contend that the con fu sion and lack o f
c larity i n Key · s seminal work on public budgeting has had the unfortunate re
sult that current budget t heories often focus on parts of budgeting rather than
the entire process. I f we use Buck's normative framework from Table 2 as a
starting point, budget theory ought to examine more than appropriating deci
sions a lo ne; rather, it should (at the least) incorporate elements of budget
preparation as well as budget decision events. Table 4 examines the normative
t heories in light of Buck's normative budgetary framework. The first column
represents Buck ·s eight budgetary steps; the top row includes all budget theo
ries categorized in Table 8.3 as '·normative." We then ascertain whether each
current budgetary theory includes Buck's normative elements.
We then undertake a similar analysis for the current instrumental, descriptive.
and explanatory theories in Tables 8.5-8.7, respectively. Considering Buck's
normative framework for budgeting, Key's question appears ambiguous in
several important aspects. What type of budgeting techniques is Key alluding
to when he discusses the ··basis'" for decision making? Is it one in which the
decision is made by the technique (the hyper-rational). merely informs the de
cision (the quasi-rational), or is the total spending level already determined
and the basis merely supports the fmal predetermined decision (anti-rational)?
Does ·'we·· refer to t he legis lature. a specific chamber of t he legislature, an ex
ecutive, the agency staff, the electorate, or the committees involved in reco n
ciling budgetary differences between legislative and executive proposals?
When is the allocation. only at the appropriating moment or also in the pre
legislative executive preparation process and post- legislative i mplementation
and rebudgeting process? When Key · s discusses the act of ··allocation:· does
he include how activity A and activity B are measured. and how goals are
known to be attained? These ambiguities can lead to very d ifferent budgetary
theories because t hey lead to very different conceptions as to what public
budgeting is. I n fact, when one examines Tables 4 through 8, it becomes quite
clear that prescriptive theories of budgeting (that is, normative and
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Table 11.5. A pp lying Buck's Budget Theory to Current Instrumental (Practices)
Budeetarv Theories
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instrumental theories) largely focus on the budget preparation phase of the
budget process, while positive theories (that is, descriptive and explanatory
theories) largely focus on the legislative appropriation event. In this respect,
these seemingly competing categories of theories are really just concerned
with different aspects o f the same budget cycle.
Tahle 11.7. Applying Buck's Budget Theory to Current Explanatory
Budeetarv Theories
Buck
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By extension, the role o f reason and planning (that is. how "rational dec i
s ion making is considered or fa ils to be considered) also seem relevant for d if
fering parts o f the ent ire budget process. Prescriptive theories are predom i
nantly hyper-rational. rationaL or quasi-rat ional In these theories, techniques
for decision making are important - even dominant in some cases (such as
cost-benefit analys is. as one example). Because these theories are essentially
recommendations. m ild or otherwise. for future participants in the budgeting
or appropriating process, these techniques then aid in max i m izing social util i
ty. On the other hand. positive theories - perhaps because they are concerned
with describing or explaining what exists -are defmed predominantly by the
quasi-rational or non-rationa l. Whereas prescriptive theories essentially desire
budgeting to take on an air of science, the positive reminds us that the role o f
interested parties renders budget ing inherently an imperfect science.
11.6. SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING NEW

Another way to categorize competing budget theories locuses on whether
the theory was developed specifically to analyze public budgeting ("'native
theories") or instead to analyze some other phenomena and later adapted to
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public budgeting (' · borrowed theories''). We categorize theories based on this
aspect as well as by the '·rationality" of the theory. These categorizations are
presented in Tables 8 . 8a through 8.8d below.
Tables 8.8a- 8.8d suggest that native theories tend towards the rational.
whi le borrowed t heories tend towards the quasi-rational or non-rationa l. S im i
larly, the native theories are general ly focused on the budget preparation stage.
whi le the borrowed theories are generally foc used on the budget decision
event.
Table ll.Sa.

Normative
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Table I t.Sb. lmtrume n t a l
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The preceding analyses also suggests that all budget theories in general including the early normative work of Buck, C leveland. and Goodnow -large-
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ly treat budget execution as an afterthought at best. Rebudgeting. dynamic re
adjustments (such as m id-year budget mod i ficat ions to incorporate changing
economic assumptions). and legacy promises that are d ifficu lt or impossible to
a lter s ignificantly ( for example, retirement benefits) have no c lear p lace in
budget t heory. Yet. these issues of execution are crit ica l for successful budget
management. For example, if legacy promises comprise a sign ificant share of
a budget. then dec ision makers are largely unable to influence a s ignificant
share the current budget. The notion of ·'who' · decides which activities to fund,
therefore. seems to include not just current decision makers. but also may in
c lude intertemporal considerations as well.
Further. budget theories tend to ignore the nested budgeting occurring with
in governmental organizations. I nstead. they focus almost entirely on budget
ing at the top level - by legis latures and/or executives. Most of the actual
budgetary dec isions, tradeoffs . and analyses, however, depend upon these
nested budget ing leve ls. That is, not only do top level actors make dec is ions,
but agency heads and staff are involved in what proposals are made. how they
are costed. how much effort will go into them, etc. This involvement and e f
fort of staff is described, fo r example, in Thurmaier & Wil loughby. 22 The real
ity of the nested nature of public budgeting further revea ls the ambigu ity o f
"who" is making the decision i n Key's question.
8.7. CONCLUSION

In a well-known tale, a group of b l indfo lded men touch an e lephant to dis
cover what it is. Each is able to touch only a single part, and the men compare
their experiences afterwards. All believe they have described different animals
and disagreement ensues. In real ity, they have all touched and described the
same e lephant, although the differences between the exper iences suggest to
them that they are completely d ifferent. In a similar ve in. budget theory has
suffered fro m d i fferent groups ·'touching•· different aspects of the budgeting
process.
I n analyzing exist ing budget theories, we begin to show how these different
budget theories can be grouped into taxonomies based on rationality and also
the techniques used or proscribed. In do ing so, we do not claim to have deve l
oped a new budget theory: instead, w e propose that these seemingly contrad ic
tory and incomplete budget theories in fact fit together. In laying o ut prescrip
tive theories or analyzing positive theories, these various authors are not so
much d isproving each other's work as building the whole "e lephant." We trace
much of this con f\Js io n to the ambiguity of Key 's c lassic statement about
budgeting in several of the important concepts in h is dec laration ("On what
basis shall we decide to allocate x dol lars to activity A instead of act ivity B?'').
22

(200 J b, p. 51-52)
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Also. we note that appropriation and budget ing are frequently used synony
mously in budget theories. Yet. as shown by early normative authors. appro
priation can easily occur even without budgeting.
This theory of exist ing theories - a metatheory of budget ing - is usefu l be
cause it a l lows us to assess where existing gaps remain and future work can be
most helpful. I ndeed. important issues in contemporary budgeting are co m
p letely unaddressed by e xisting theories. For examp le. a l l theories currently
assume that appropriat ions or budgets will be approved and implemented; the
federal government. as well as several important states (such as Ne\v York).
have long histories of budget stalemates where budgets may not exist for
months at a time. Also, budget theories genera lly treat all spend ing as equaL I n
reality. certain program areas - such as funding for war o r national defense are frequently given preferential budgetary treatment by decision makers.
Such funding is rarely reduced and frequently increased. Yet no existing theo
ry can adequately expl a in this reality of "sacred cow" budgeting. On a related
note. public budgeting has become a battleground for broader ideological d is
agreements over the proper role of government in society. I ssues that may be
economically insignificant for the budget as a whole (such as funding for the
arts. earmarks. mass transit, as examples at the federal leve l) serve as stand-ins
for this battle. This · ·symbo l ic" budgeting is certainly driven by d ifferent be
l iefs about the goals of government and budgeting. Yet we know little about
t h is important development. Also. \Ve know little about how ··patronage"'
budgeting - in which public money is steered towards spec ific goals, agencies,
vendors and local it ies ( inside and o utside government) - operates. Such pat
ronage is especially relevant at the subnat ional level where public contracts
are often steered towards po l itically connected groups. For example. in New
York C ity, one counci l member was forced to resign and serve jail t ime after
admitting to steering publ ic money to a not-for-profrt group operated by fami
ly members: at the state level. a prominent Assembly member has fought ac
cusations for decades that his not-for-profit group - the rec ipient of s ign ificant
pub l ic largesse - is simply a personal s lush fund. The greedy bureaucrat theo
ry seems somehow re levant to exp laining these, yet N iskanen's t heory focuses
only on the internal agency bureaucrat and does not seem able to explain how
external agents and elected polit ic ians can also engage in such behavior. A l l in
a l � this beginn in g of a metatheory suggests that despite the progress we have
made in understanding budgeting. this po l icy arena continues to develop, re
quiring theory to continually develop with it.
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APPENDIX A

BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF BUDGET THEORIES IN TABLE 3
NORMATIVE THEORIES

C lassic Econom ic Man (CEM) - "Economic man has a complete and con
s istent system of preferences that a l lows h im always to choose among the a l
ternatives open to h im ; he is a lways completely aware of what these alterna
tives are: there are no limits on the complexity of the computations he can per
form in order to detennine which a lternat ives are best: probability calculations
are neither frightening nor mysterious to him:' 23
Marginality (MARG) - The use of "incremental analys is'· as d iscussed by
Verne Lewis24 to compare programs or other budget elements at t he ir margins
to provide the capacity to increase the total ut ility of the budget.
Portfo l io Theory ( PT) - The use of the private sector device k nown as port
fo lio theory to increase the .. expected return" of the activit ies of government.
..
Expected return" is operationalized in terms of quantities of desired outcome
units. The goa l is to maxim ize uti l ity by ach ieving the maximum achievable
joint return in a l l programs within exist ing constraints. 25
Early Budget L iterature (EBL) - The view of Goodnow. C leveland and
Buck as discussed in the main text. See the eight essent ial characteristics in
Table I .
Why A instead of B ? ( A or B) - V. 0. Key26 asks . ..O n what basis shall \Ve
decide to allocate x dol l ars to activity A instead of activity B ?" H e goes on to
say. '·If it is assumed that an agency is operat ing at maximum effic iency. t he
question remains whether t he function is worth carrying out at a l l, or whether
it should be carried out on a reduced or enlarged scale, w ith result ing transfers
of funds to or from other activities of greater or lesser social ut i l it y:' 27 While
this is a demand for a theory. it is also a rudimentary theory, one that suggests
that budgeting is a problem of economic allocat ion .

�3 Herbert Alexander Simon, Administrative behavior: a study ofdecision-making processes in
administrative organization. 3d ed (New York: Free Press, 1976). xxvii.
24

Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting."
Aman Khan. "Budgets and Portfolios." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed. Aman
Kahn and W. Bartley Hil dreth ( Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002).
�6 Key, "The Lack ofa Budgetary Theory." 1138.
27 Ibid. 1 1 39.

25

.

Towards a metatheory of budgeting

1 95

Keynesianism - John M aynard Keynes28 argues t hat the jurisdiction-wide
economy is subject to cyc l ical behavior that must be balanced by governmen
tal fiscal behavior. When the economy is underperform ing, the government as buyer of last resort - should borrow as necessary to create demand and in
crease economic performance, primarily through increasing employment. The
point of this is to soften the trough of economic cycles. The role of the budget
ceases to be to fu nd the operations of government. except secondarily. I ts pri
mary purpose is as a fiscal dev ice to modulate the economy.
Comprehensive Budgeting (CB) - The word ""comprehensive·· appears
most frequently in budget d iscussion as an adjective w it hout definit ion. There
are four ways in which a budget can be comprehensive: ( 1 ) B udgets can com
pletely address all aspects of financ ial resources by avo iding ""off budget"" de
vices. In this respect . the federal budget of the United States and the budget of
the C ity of New York are not comprehensive as they have devices for spend
ing money that are not subject to budgetary review. (2) Budgets can provide
all the types of information that budget users or budget academ ics think should
be in a budget. Presumably . a co mprehensive information budget would have
old-style performance data. new-style outcomes data, program data, some
marginal effect data. and, of course. financ ial data, p lus explanatory tex1. (3)
Budgets can comprehensively address the ent ire budget period: the last com
pleted period: the current. incomplete period; the budget year: and one or two
outlook years. (4) B udgets can address all the potent ially scare resources of
the jurisdiction: money. staffing levels. space, and anything else that might be
scarce. I n addit io n to these four dimensions of comprehensiveness. compre
hensive budgets may also make extensive use of analysis.
Executive B udget (EB) - A progressive era view that has developed and
expanded throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century; modeled
on the corporat ion, the CEO is in charge of the government and the legis lature
serves as the corporate board. According to this p lan, the executive prepares a
budget and presents it to the legislature who then acts on it. I n differing ver
sions across the United States this legis lat ive action can range from rubber
stamping, to modest reduction with no authority to increase expenditures, to
latent or actual capac ity to completely revamp the budgetary proposal before
. .
29
mak.mg t he appropnat1on.
John Maynard Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest and money (Atlantic
Publishers & Distributors, 2006): Eric M. Patashnik. " Ideas. I nheritances. and the D)11am ics
of Budgetary Change." Governance 1 2, no. 2 ( 1 999).
29 Cleveland. "Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States."; Goodnow, "The Limit of
Budgetary Control.": Paul L. Posner. "The Continuity of Change: Public Budgeting and
Finance Reforms over 70 Years." Public Administration Review 67. no. 6 (2007): Wi lliam
Franklin Willoughby, "Allotment of Funds by Executive Officials. An Essential Feature of
any Correct Budgetary System," Proceedings ofAmerican Political Science Association 9. no.
Ninth Annual Meeting ( 1 9 1 2).
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Top-Down/Bottom-Up Budgeting-Top-down (TO) budgeting is dominated
by top members o f the executive branch and the legislative branch. Decisions
made by these top ranked actors inc lude such matters as targets for programs
or departments. Lower ranked dec isions are sharply constrained by these top
down decisions. Bottom-up (BU) budgeting builds the case for funding from
the lower functional levels of the organ izations and aggregates up to the total
30
budget. Top-down budgeting may seek to prevent unwanted proposals and
require desired proposals in bottom-up submissions.
Satis ficing (SAT) - Because the adm in istrator is lim ited in his ability to
perform and his abil ity to make correct decisions by such th ings as lim iting
dispositions, l i m ited values. and lim ited resources for decision making. the
admin istrator should perform analys is and exami ne options sufficient ly to
make a good enough decision. Once a decision seems good enough. further
effort is ineffect ive. Herbert Sirnon 3 1 labels the dec is ion makers' l im itations
··bounded rational ity.' · and the consequential real istic dec is io n procedure, · ·sat
isficing. ··
I ncrementalism (INC) - Charles L indblom 32 proposes that policy decisions
are made not through a means-ends reasoning process. but through an iterative
experiential ly corrective process. which he labels successive l i m ited compari
son. He asserts that this is the preferable method of pol icy making because
means-ends reasoning relies on theoretical reasoning. w h ich. for him, means
predicting the consequences of actions w ithout the a id of experience and
which, he asserts, people do quite poorly. Two other important components
are that ( 1) the object of po I icy making is agreement and (2) both the methods
and the ends of policies (not the methods alone) are selected in the process of
seeking agreement. As proposed by L indblom this is a theory of po l icy mak
ing. but Aaron W ildavsky and col leagues 33 adopted it as a theory of budgeting.
Opt imum Decisions (00) - Yehezkel Dror34 says:
-

Some clarification o f values. objectives, and dec ision-criteria.

30

Barry Bozeman and Jeffrey D. Straussman, "Shrinking Budgets and the Shrinkage of
Budget Theory," Public Administration Review 42, no. 6 ( 1 982).
31 Simon. Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in administrative

organization.
32

Lindblom, "The Science of"Muddling Through"."
W ildavsky. The politics of the budgetary process: Davis, Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky,
"A Theory of the Budgetary Process.": Wildavsky. " Political Implications of Budgetary
Reform."
34 Yehezkel Dror. " Muddling Through-"Science" or Inertia?." Public Administration Review
24. no. 3 (1964): 1 56.
33
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I dentification o f a lternatives, accompanied by a conscious effort to consider
new alternatives (through survey of comparative l iterature. experience and
available theories) and to stimu late creative alternative innovation.
Pre l iminary estimation of expected pay-off of various a lternatives and dec i
sions whether a strategy of m in imal risk or a strategy of innovation is pre f
erable.
I f the first, the "successive limited comparison" model should be fo llowed.
I f the latter, the next e lement is establishment of a cut-off for considering
possible results of a lternative policies and identification of main expected
results, relying on available know ledge and intu it ion.
The test of the optimum po licy is that it is agreed upon by the various ana
lysts after fu l l and frank discussion of stages 1 to 4.
A conscious e ffo rt is made to decide whether the problem is important
enough to make analysis more comprehensive.
Theory and experience. rationality and extrarationality a l l are relied upon.
the composition of the mLx depending upon their avai labi l ity and the nature
of the problem.
Exp licit arrangements are made to improve the quality o f po l icy making
through systematic learning fro m experience, stimulat io n of in itiative and
creativity. staff development and encouragement of intel lectual effort.

M ixed Scanning (MS) - For Jesser decis ions, problems that are not severe,
or minor corrections of d irection, fo llow an approach that resembles or is in
crementalism. For more signi ficant dec ision-making. pursue a st rategy that
resembles comprehensive rational ity. 35
Responsibi l ity B udgeting - L. R. Jones and Fred Thompson fo l lowing
3
Robert Anthony say: 6
C lassify all admin istrative u nit s as either mission or support centers.
Charge a l l costs accrued by support centers . . . to the m issio n centers they
serve.
Fund mission centers to cover their expected expenses - inc lud ing support
center charges.
Establish a working capital fu nd to provide short-term financing for support
units.
Establish a capital asset fund . . . .

H

Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed-Scanning: A "TI1ird" Approach to Decision-Making," Public

Administration Review 27, no. 5 ( 1 967).
36

L. R. Jones and Fred Thompson. " Responsibil i ty Budgeting and Accounting Reform." in

Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed . Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth ( Westport,
Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002), 1 46; Robert Newton Anthony. "New Frontiers in
Defense Financial Management." The Federal Accountant, no. I I ( 1 962).
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Based on this descript ion. responsibility budgeting is a form of program
budgeting where o n ly cost centers that serve the purpose of the organization
are funded d irectly. Support services must · 'earn' · their fu nds by providing
support. Jones and Thompson also describe this form of budgeting as not en
gaging in detailed budgeting at the responsibility center level, instead manag
ers at that level have both responsibil ity and discretion to achieve purposes
with funds provided.
INSTRUMENTAL THEORIES

Zero B ase B udget ing (ZBB) - I n the public sector, ZBB is generally
thought to fo l low the concepts of marginality promoted by Verne Lewis. To
accomp l ish this, a budget for a ftmction, division. or other component of gov
ernment is delivered at several levels: one below the current funding level, one
equal to the current funding leve l, and one or more above the current funding
level. W ith each, the packet shows what the component can accompl ish with
its funds. The decision maker is then able to select a package that increases
total utility over the prior year's utility. 37
Cost- Benefit Ana lysis (CBA) - Also called Benefit-Cost Analysis. refers to
computing all costs and all benefits of a program and subtracting benefits from
costs (net) or representing the two as a ratio with benefits shown as the numer
38
ator and values above one showing a gain. Variat ions include:
•

Net Present Value (NPV). wh ich brings a l l costs and benefits to the pre
sent period by applying an appropriate discount rate before calculat ing the
39

net value.
•

Cost E ffect iveness Analysis (CEA), which compares two or more pro
40
posals that are taken to have the same benefit so lely on their costs.

•

Life Cycle Costing ( LCC). which is a form of cost effectiveness analys is
that assures that purchasing decisions consider not only capital costs, but
also costs of operation. 41 LCC has been ex1ended to many other uses and
could be considered to be comprehensive NPV.

37 Donald Axelrod. Budgeting/or modem Government, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1 995).
38 Daniele Capone and Daniel W. Williams, "The History of Evaluation through Regulatory
Impact Analysis: a Path from Accounting to Accountability," Journal of International
Business 3, no. I (20 I I ).
39 l bid.
40 Ibid.
4 1 Greg Chen. Daniel W. Williams, and Trocls Pind Adrian, "Life Cycle Costing," in
Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Second Edition. ed. Jack Rabin
(Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2008).
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Regul atory I mpact Analysis (RIA). which appl ies CBA or NPV to the
evaluation of regulat ions. 42

Expenditure Control B udgeting (ECB) - ··ECB has five general operating
elements. F irst. ECB uses a 'base" budget to determin e the appropriation for
the next fiscal year. The base budget is annua l ly adjusted for population
growth and changes in the cost of l iving. Second, ECB assumes exist ing ser
vice levels and requires the c ity manager and c ity cou nc i l to approve any
changes in service levels. It also permits the c ity manager to transfer a l loca
tions among departments within the overa ll appropriations level to correct m i
nor imbalances in funding. Th ird, department directors are responsible for
costs of future increases in progran1ming as we ll as for increases in service
levels. Retained savings generated by the department provide the funds used
for such service expansions. Fourth, each year's under expend itures are carried
forward to the next year. Fifth, depatiments are required to budget administra
tively at the line- item level. '' 43
Line Item B udgeting (LIB) - Th is theory of budgeting, or more strictly. o f
appropriat ing, predated early twentieth century budget reforms and was. in
part, what some of those reformers intended to replace. 44 The appropriat ing
authority funds expenditures in extreme detail focused on the resources to be
purchased by government, which are now known as objects of expend iture.
Employees may be funded by name or position in the appropriat ion.
Hoover Performance B udgeting (HPB) - Performance is demo nstrated
through cost effectiveness, which means that budget documents contain exten
sive cost-per-unit data at t he homogenous work activity level. Ho mogenous
work act ivities are q u ite detailed much more so than programs. A Hoover per
formance budget addresses the question whether government is gett ing the
45
most for its money in terms of price for work produced. This form of budget
requires accurate and ex1ens ive cost accounting in fo rmation. Performance
B udgeting is impl icit ly associated with the systems model. which transferred
from engineering to operations research/management science at approximately
the same t ime: 46
42

Capone and Williams, "The History of Evaluation through Regulatory Impact Analysis: a
Path from Accounting to Accountability."
43 Eric B. Herzik, "Improving Budgetary Management and Fostering I nnovation: Expenditure
Control Budgeting." Public Productivity and Management Review 14. no. 3 (1991) : 24 1 .
44 Goodnow, "The Lim it of Budgetary Control."
45 Arthur Eugene Buck, " Performance Budgeting for the Federal Government," Tax Review X.
no. 7 (1949).
46 J. W.
Mauchly, "TI1e advantages of built-in checking" (1953): Rich ard Bellman,
"Mathematical Aspects of Scheduling Theory," Jo�;rnal of the Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics 4. no. 3 (1956); George B. Dantzig, "Thoughts on Linear Programming
and Automation." Management Science 3, no. 2 (1957).
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I nput-7 Throughput-? Output-70utcome
This model has many variations related to feedback loops and external en
vironmental impact (open systems). It is, itself, a sophist ication of the s imple
47
input/output concepts of Frederick Taylor. It is impl icated in a number of
instrumental theories.
Program B udgeting (PROG) - A program budget is a system wide exami
nation of the purposes of government with technical evaluat ion of the utility
cost of progran1 results considering alternatives to achieve resu lts. Programs
are broader than departments and can be cross-cutting. that is. found in part in
d ifferent departments. ( I n practice, programs are found w ithin departments or
are departments.) Part of the point of program budgeting is to allow economic
evaluation of means of achieving goals between d ifferent programs that may
48
be found in different sectors.
Planning. Programm ing and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) - PPBS, some
t imes just PPB, refers to the integration of techn iques such as cost benefit
analysis. policy analysis, performance budgeting, program budgeting. etc .. to
produce a comprehensive approach to budgeting. PPB S is c losely associated
with Program Budgeting (see). TI1is approach was considered successful at the
49
Department of Defe nse during the 1 960s. It is general ly thought that when
50
the federal government expanded this approach governme nt-wide. it fa i led.
Sometimes it is asserted that various elements of PPBS remain scattered
across government.
Management by Objectives ( MBO) - MBO is a management theory. but it
is called a budget related theory by Irene Rubin 5 1 among others. In the budget
context, it calls for a practice of setting objectives, setting priorit ies. then allo
cating resources according to those objectives and priorities. 52 A variant Ia-

F.W. Taylor, Shop management (Harper & Brothers. 1 9 1 1 ); F.W. Taylor. "Scientific
management," New York ( 1 9 1 1 ) .
48 Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for Program Budgeting," in Program Budgeting,
ed. David Novick (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1 965).
49 Fremont James Lyden and George A. Shipman. " Developments in Public Administration."
Public Administration Review 26, no. I ( 1 966).
so
Aaron B. Wildavsky. "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," Public Administration
Review 29, no. 2 ( 1 969).
SI
Irene S. Rubin, "Budget Theory and Budget Practice: How Good the Fit?." Public
Administration Review 50. no. 2 ( 1 990).
s2
Peter F. Drucker, "What Results Should You Expect? A Users' Guide to MBO," Public
Administration Review 36. no. I ( 1 976).
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beled results based budgeting may be assoc iated with the systems model . see
the entry for Hoover Perfom1ance Budgeting. 53
Target Base Budgeting - TBB is a variant of Z B B that is less information
intensive. A base w it h appropriate adjustments is set at the beginning of the
budget submiss ion process. Departments are generally prohibited fro m asking
for more fimds than in the t arget base, but are given (some) d iscretion to pro
pose reallocation o f funds w ithin the ir own d iscretionary activit ies. Thus. mar
ginal tradeoffs are made by the department heads wh i le preparing their budget
submission. Final approval passes through the executive and legis lative pro
54
cesses.
1 990s Performance Budgeting- PB. also called Performance Based Budgeting
(PBB, not to be confused with PPB). comes in three forms: presentational, where per
formance information is included in the text of the budget proposal: performance in
formed, where future resources are linked to future performance targets or results:
and d irect performance budgeting. where "the allocation of resources directly and
explicitly to units of performance. genera lly outputs.''55 PB relies on the systems
model; see the entry for H oover Performance Budgeting.
Best Pract ices (BP) - Roy Meyers recommends: 56
A budget process should be:
1 . Comprehensive - inc ludes all uses o f the government's financial resources:
2. Honest - based on unbiased projections;
3. Perceptive - considers the long-term as we ll as t he near-tern1;
4. Constrained - l i m its the amount of money that need be acquired by the government:
5. Judgmental- seeks ways of obtaining the most effects for the least costs:
6. Cooperative - does not dom inate other important dec is ion processes:
7 . Timely - completes regular tasks when expected,
8. Transparent - is understandable w ithout intensive effort:
9. Legit imate - reserves important decis ions to legally-appropriate authorities.
I O.Responsive - adopts po l ic ies that match public preferences
Outcome B udgeting (OB) - A variant of MBO or performance budget ing
that asks the top decision maker to pay fo r what is desired, that is outcomes,
rather than resources needed ( l ine- item budgeting), detailed managerial costs
5 3 Peter F. Drucker. Alanaging for results; economic tasks and risk-taking decisions, [ I st ed.
(New York.: Harper & Row. 1 964).
54 Thomas W. Wenz and Ann P. Nolan, "Budgeting for the Future: Target Base Budgeting."
Public Budgeting & Finance 2, no. 2 { 1 982).
5 5 Teresa Curristine and Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Development. eds.,
Performance budgeting in OECD countries (Paris: OECD. 2007), 2 1 .
56 Roy T . Meyers. "ls There a Key t o the Normative B udge ting Lock?," Policy Sciences 29,
no. 3 ( 1 996): 1 76.
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(Hoover Performance Budget i ng), or planning (program budget ing). Out
comes budget ing is another theory that re l ies on the systems mode l of budget
ing, see the entry for Hoover Performance B udgeting. 57
Budget Enforcement Act of

1 990 (BEA) - BEA (a US federal Jaw) is a re

form to Gramm-Rudman-Hol l ings (see). "BEA has three sets of ru les: adjust
able defic it targets. caps

on discretionary spend ing. and pay-as-you-go
8
(PAYGO) ru les for revenues and d irect spending." 5 The defic it targets are set
in law, but can be adjusted during the annual budget process. PA YGO refers

to the process of requ ir in g appropriating comm ittees to self- fu nd new expendi
tures. general l y by reducing other expenditures w ithin the ir domain. Thus,
BEA is a variant of program budgeting, but also see Rights Based B udgeting.

Nonconventional budgets (NON) - Gerald l'vli l ler says. ·'In governments

across the world, we find not only the trad itional c a l l for a separate capital

budget but also c a l ls for a tax expenditure budget. a mandate budget. a regula

tory budget. a credit budget. and an insurance budget.'' 5 9 M i l ler l inks this idea

to super- ( i n the sense of comprehensive) budgets . He suggests the purpose o f
these sorts of budgets is control, which h e says have fi v e e lements: focus, at
tention from decision makers; estimation, determ i n ing the cost o f the resource

for requested projects in a budget period: scarcity. setting a c e i l ing for the
avai lab i l ity of the budgeted reso urce: criteria, determ i n in g ru les or perm iss ible

justifications for se lection among projects that demand the resource: a nd a de
v ice for reaching decis ions.

Workforce S ize Budgets (WORK) -A version of nonconvent ional budget
ing (see) that may be more common than many is the workforce s ize budget.

In the federal government, workforce s ize budget ing cons ists of agenc ies just i
6
fy ing their staffing level to OMB. 0 Anecdotal info rmation known to the au

thors shows that some state and local governments spec i fy maximum work
force s ize in their respective appropriations, but t his practice is not well repre

sented in the l iterature. A sophist icated version of t h is pract ice calcu lates

workforce s ize at annual ized fu l l t ime equ ivalency. A w id e ly known method

of evad ing this type of budget constraint is the h iring consu ltants from temp

57

La\\Tcnce L Martin. "Budgeting for Outcome." in Budget Theory in 1he Public Sector. ed.
Am an Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth ( Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002).
58 Allen Schick, The federal Budget: politics, policy, process (Washington. D.C.: Brookings
Institution. 1 995). 39.
59 Gerald J. M i l ler.
"Nonconventional Budgets: Interpreting Budgets and Budgeting
Interpretations," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley
Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002), 77.
60 Peter M. Benda and Charles H. Levine. "The Assignment and Institutionalization of
Functions at OMB: Lessons from Two Cases in Work-Force Management," in New Directions
in Budget Theory. ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1 988).
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agenc ies, where these consultants function l i ke regular emp loyees but are not

on the regular payro ll.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) - The Balance Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1 985. better kno·wn as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. ..called for the pro
gressive reduction i n the deficit in each fiscal year from 1 9 86 through 1 990 and for a
balanced budget in 1 99 1 . It a lso provided for the cancellation of budget resources if
the projected deficit exceeded the target by more than an allowed amount:'61 This
device treated decision-makers as incapable of reaching satisfactory decisions. thus,
automatic devices would be used to force appropriates in the satisfactory level in the
budget implementation stage.
DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES
2

Rational Po licy Mode l (RPM) - Graham A l l ison6

describes three ap

proaches to decisio n making. The rat ional po l icy model assumes that the dec i
sions are rational. I n it i a l ly goals and objectives are determined. Options are
identi fied. The consequence of each option is thoroughly evalu ated. Based o n
these options. the value- maximizing opt ion is selected. The Rat ional P o l icy
Model is a descriptive vers ion o f C lass ic Economic Man (see). A l l iso n · s two
alternatives are Organ izat ion Process (see) and Bureaucratic P o l it ics (see).

Macrobudgeting ( MAC) - At the macro level, budgeting is co mprehensive
top-dovm budget ing aimed at contro l li ng system w ide contro llable expend i

tures. Key participants are the executive and the top comm ittee members, that
is. the most powerfu l members of both the execut ive and legislat i ve branches

of government. The process is centralized. There is increased use of mu lt i-year
decis ions. Formal ized devices such as B E A and GRH are used. The legislative
6
decision process is transparent. 3

Empirical N orms (NORM) - Budgets a l locate funds to categories of ser

vice. By exami n ing n umerous commun ities one can determine reasonable e x

pectat ions for per u n it expenditure for typical services de l ivered by communi
ties. The selection of unit depends o n the type of service. 64

61

Schick, The federal Budget: politics, policy, process: 39.
Graham T. Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American
Political Science Review 63, no. 3 ( 1 969): Graham T. Allison, Essence ofdecision; explaining
the Cuban missile crisis (Boston,: Little. 1 97 1 ).
63 Leloup. "From Microbudgeting to Macrobudgeting: Evolution in Theory and Practice.":
Lance T. Leloup. "Budget Theory for a New Century." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector,
cd. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002).
6-1 Mabel L. Walker, Municipal Expenditures, vol. Extra Volumes, Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science New Series, No. 1 3 (Baltim ore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1 930): Julia Beckett, "Early Budget Theory: The Progressive Theory of Public
Expenditures," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley

61

204

Williams & Calabrese

Organizat ion a l Process (OP) - Governments are a loose c o a l it io n o f organ
izat ions in factional debate w ith parochial concerns. Decisions are constrained

by organizat ional norms of acceptable action. Problems are addressed sequen
tially. Organ izations use standard operating procedures ( S OPs) and c lusters of

SOPs to resolve problems. They seek to avoid uncertainty by contro l l ing their

environment. For non-ro ut ine problems. they search for \Vays to app ly their

existing capac it ies and they general ly do not change over t ime except under
extreme conditions. The loose coa l it io n of organ izations creates a conflict be

tween decentral ized act io n and centralized coordination. Organ izations tend
6;
towards increment a l change. Mark Green and Fred Thompson use the organ

izational process concept to discuss budget process as a n u nderstanding of S i
6
66
mon. Lindblom and W ildavsky.
Fo l lo w ing John Crecine 7 they discuss the

role of inst itut ion a l p layers such as the mayor, who form parts of what A l lison

called a loose coalit ion, and the routines fo l lowed in budgeting (SOPs and
c lusters of SOPs). E fforts to reduce complexity parallel the o bject ive of c o n
tra lling uncertainty.

Authorizat ion Process (AP) - Authorizing comm ittees interact w ith and
sometimes compete w it h appropriat ing committees. Appropriat ing comm ittees

may take roles of authorizing comm ittees when authorizing committees are
moving too s low ly for the appropriations calendar. Where the act iv it ies to be

authorized are controversiaL the encroachment may be in the opposite d irec
68

t ion.

Princ iple-Agent ( PA) - The budget reflects a princ i p le-agent relationship.
wh ich has the characteristics o f hierarchy, goal conflict, and i n fo rmat io n
asymmetry. P rinc ipals make demands on resources of agents, who ration their

�

resources for princ ipals - that is. princ i a ls make demands that agents comply
6
U nder all three principal-agent cond i

w·ith only to the degree that they must.

tions one can expect ··agency dominance," (see Greedy Bureaucrat""). A lterna

t ive understandings reflect " legislat ive dominance." where the legislature does

Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002): Daniel W. Wi lliam s, "Evolution of
Performance Measurement to 1 930." Administration and Societv 36, no. 2 (2004).
;
65 Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.' ; Allison. Essence of decision;
explaining the Cuban missile crisis.
66
Mark T. Green and Fred Thompson, "Organizational Process Models of Budgeting," in
Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting. ed. John R. Bartle (Amsterdam: JAI i mprint, 200 I ).
67 John P. Crecine. Governmental problem-solving; a computer simulation of municipal
budgeting, American politics research series (Chicago,: Rand McNally. 1 969).
8
6
Irene S. Rubin. "The Authorization Process: ln�plications for Budget Theory." in New
Directions in Budget Theory, ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University ofNew York Press,
1 988).
69 John P. Forrester, "The Principal-Agent Model and Budget Theory." in Budget Theory in
the Public Sector, ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hildreth (Westport. Connecticut: Quorum
Books. 2002): Goodnow, "The Limit of Budgetary Control."
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not fully reveal its preferences, thus gaining the upper hand in negotiations;
"executive dominance:· largely reflecting the preclearance budget submissio n
process through an executive central budget office that centralizes. coordi
nates, and officia lly subm its the budget to the legislature; and "issue net
works." where members of the legislature and members of interest groups join
together to control aspects of dec ision making.
Economic funct ions of budgeting (ECO) - There are three basic economic
functions of budgeting: allocation, the governmental budget can a llocate goods
when markets fa i l due to the existence of public or collective consumption
goods, externalit ies. natural monopol ies, or consumer ignorance: distribution,
the governmental budget can serve to redistribute goods where market condi
tions create extreme economic inequality; and stab i lization, the government
70
budget can reduce the e ffect of economic cyc les (see Keynesian ism).
Budget Strategies (BS) - Agencies are more successfu l in their budgeting
when they consider the pub lic support for their programs. Under four levels of
support there are d iffering optimal internal strategies (proposals) and external
strategies ( legislat ive polit ics): Broad weak support for outcomes leads to in
cremental proposals and transparent cooperat ive legis lative strategies. Narrow
intense support leads to c laims for equity and reliance on the c lientele in the
polit ical process. Moderate resistance to financing targeted strategies. such as
cutting waste or sharp focus on mission, and to confidence building in the po
litical environment . H igh resistance to outcomes leads to analytic or other
strong approaches. such as cost benefit analysis. and to ex1ernal strategies fo
71
cused on dividing power.
Super B udgets ( S B) - · ·super-budgets are conceived less a s documents or
even as autonomous processes than as systems, interacting with other systems.
At their core lies the fundamental revenue mobilization and expenditure func
tion. but they are also an integral part of other systems, include the intergov
ernmental syste m, the economic system, and the po lit ical-bureaucratic syst em. n
..

Punctuated Equil ibrium (PE) - Budgets are generally stable fol lowing the
construct of incre mentalism or, in any case, not changing rad ically in most pe70

Merl M. Hackbart and James B. Ramsey, "The Theory of Public Sector Budget: An
Economic Perspective." in Budget Theory in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W.
Bartley Hildreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002).
71 Marcia L. Whicker and Changhwan Mo, "The Impact of Agency Mission on Agency
Budget Strategy: A Deductive Theory," in Budget Theory in the Public Sector, cd. Aman
Kahn and W. Bartley Hi ldreth (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2002).
7=' Naomi Caiden. "Shaping Things to Come: Super-Budgeters as Heroes (and Heroines) in the
Late-Twentieth CcntUI)'," in New Directions in Budget Theory, ed. Irene S. Rubin (Albany:
State University of New York Press. I 988), 48..
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riods. However, aperiod ic a l ly stabi l ity is d isturbed. This d isturbance may be

consistent w ith the Agendas theory (see) or w ith M ixed Scanning (see). Ev i
dence exists for such aperiodic budgeting. 73

R ights Based B udgeting (RBB) - The existence of large transfer payment

programs that the courts have interpreted as e nt it lements and the engagement

of the courts in requ iring the expenditure of funds to fu l fi l l court determined
rights has narrowed the execut ive- legislative d iscretion over the budget creat
ing a rigid obligat ion to expend funds. One method of managing budgets is to

take a long-term look at entit lements. 74

Bureaucratic P o l it ics ( BUR) - The government comprises indiv iduals who
are p layers in the dec isio n- making process. P layers are focused on parochial
priorities and they seek to protect their own interests and maint ain the ir own
power. Strategic d e c is io ns are replaced by focus o n matters demanding imme
d iate attention. There are routine •·channels" for determ i ning who decides and
how to proceed. Decisions are not analyt i c or calcu lated, they are the part of
the uncertainty. pace and chaotic nature of dec is io n making. Dec ision o ut
comes are the aggregate of mult i p le individual dec isions . Group actions may
not reflect any part icu lar person ' s intentions. Part ic ipants· roles affect their
.

JUdgment. 75

Transaction Cost P o l it ics (TCP) - John Bartle and Jun M a 7 6 explore TCP

theories related to budgeting. Fo l lowing Patashnik 7 7 they v iew budgets as
contracts and see three transaction cost c la ims: 7 8

( I ) The costs of negat ing and enforc ing budget contracts shape the
budgetary process. and through it, the budgetary o utcome:

(2) Po l it ic a l actors del iberately craft institutional safeguards to add du
rabi l ity to the ir comm itments; and

73

Meagan M. Jordan. "Punctuated Equilibrium: An Agenda-Based Theory of Budgeting. " in

Budget The01y in the Public Sector. ed. Aman Kahn and W. Bartley Hi ldreth (Westport.
Connecticut: Quorum Books. 2002).
74 Jeffrey D. Straussman. "Rights-Based Budgeting." in New Directions in Budget Theory, ed.
Irene S. Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1 988).
75 Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.": Allison, Essence of decision;

explaining the Cuban missile crisis.

76

John R. Bartle and Jun Ma, "Applying Transaction Cost Theory IO Public Budgeting and
Finance." in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeti11g, ed. John R. Bartle (Amsterdam: JAI
imprint, 200 I ).
77 Eric M. Patashnik, "The Contractual Nature of Budgeting: A Transaction Cost Perspective
on the Design of Budgeting Institutions." Policy Sciences 29. no. 3 ( 1 9%).
78 Bartle and Ma, "Applying Transaction Cost Theory to Public Budgeting and Finance." 162.
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(3) B u dget reforms are unlikely to succeed if they fai l to take into ac
count both the potential for opportun istic po l it ical behavior and the
inherent need of complex transact ions for contractual safeguards.
They also examine TCP related to budget execution, tax po l ic y and fiscal

pol icy. They propose treating budgets as contracts where partic ipants have the
attributes of bounded rat iona l ity, opportunism, and lack of risk neutrality. The
transactions occur under cond it ions of uncertainty.

b ilateral information

asymmetry, and asset specificity (commitment to program cont inu ity).
Ambigu ity & I nterpret ive Budgets (AMB) - Organ izat ions are loosely cou

pled and dec is ions are outcomes of mult ip le independent streams (see Garbage

Can). Budgets invo lve r ituals and symbo ls to construct lisca l real ity. The lan

guage of analytic c ho ice is merely metaphorical, helping to construct the per
ception of order out of anarchy. 79

79

Gerald J. Miller. Governmem financial management theory. Public administration and
public policy 43 (New York: M. Dekker. 1 99 1 ): Janet Foley Orosz. "The Truth is Out There:
Is Postmodern Budgeting the Real Deal?." in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting. ed. John
R. Bartle (Amsterdam : JA I imprint. 200 1 ).
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EXPLANATORY THEORIES

Median Voter Theory (MVT) - Voting is a method of g iv i n g a decision

mak ing proxy to representatives. To obtain that proxy. the representative must

convince a m ajority of voters to select him. The m ajority cons ists of 50% p lus
one, or the med ian. Assuming that the voters have s ingle peaked preferences.

the cand idate need o n ly learn and act upon the preferences of the med ian voter
to become e lected and reelected. For budget ing, this means finding the tax and
service package that satisfies the median voter. 80

r,

I nterest Group P l u ra l ism (IGP) - I nterest
oups take a d irect role in influ
encing legis lati n that a ects the interests. 8 I �terest gro 1 s are a tY e of de
�
p
� .p
scendent of fact 1ons as d 1scussed m the Federalzst Papers. - The dommance of

�

�

any particu lar faction wo u ld be ruinous for a republ ic, but the competition of
relatively equal fact ions is how democracy works. This co mpetition and
agreement over budgetary shares works in tandem with incrementalist theo
ries. 83
Garbage Can (GC) - A n organ ized anarchy has i l l-defmed u n certain pref
erences. u nc lear techno logy and fluid participation. A dec ision is an outcome
of independent streams: Problems arise ins ide and outside the organ ization and

can have almost any nexus w it h the organ ization . So lutions are someone's

product looking for a question. Participants and their "energy leve l" are te m

porarily associated w it h the organization . And, choice opportunities are occa
s ions that call for a decision. In the garbage can, there are streams of each of
these with decision opportunities possibly being demarked as d iscrete mo

ments in t ime. Deci s io ns occur when there are confluences of a l l of these
.
. .
4
streams at a dec!Sion po mt. 8
Agendas (AGEN) - John Kingdon reformulates the Garbage Can theory

(see) fmding three crit ical streams: problem recogn ition, pol icy development,

80

B. Ward. "Majority rule and allocation. " Journal of Conflict Resolution ( 1 96 1 ): G. Garvey.
"The theory of party equil i brium. " The American Political Science Review 60 no. I ( 1 966):
ibid.; Paula S. Kearns and John R. Bartle, "The Median Voter Model in Public Budgeting
Research," in Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting, ed. John R. B artle (Amsterdam: JAI
imprint, 200 I ).
81
Robert A. Dahl, "Workers' Control of I ndustry and the British Labor Party." The American
Political Science Review 4 1 . no. 5 ( 1 94 7).
8:
James Madison et aL Thefederalist papers (Penguin classics. I 987) ..
83 Irene S. Rubin, "Budgeting: Theory and Concepts," in Public Budgeting and Finance, ed.
Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1 995).
84
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March. and Johan P. Olsen. "A Garbage
- Can Model of
Organizational Choice," A dministrative Science Quarterly 1 7, no. I ( 1 972).
.
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They work independently and must achieve confluence to open

a policy w indow (an opportunity for dec ision making).

Real Time B udgeting (RTB) - B udgeting involves five ·'linked c lusters:
8
revenues, process. expenditures. balance, and implementation." 6 These semi

independent streams interact in complex ways that stro ngly affect the abi l ity to

make dec i s ions and the content of the decis ions themse lves. There are info r

mation dependenc ies between the streams wh ich constrain decis ions. M icro
issues (the cost of the operation of government) and macro- issues (fiscal po l i
8
cy) constrain each other. 7 Consequently, there must be constant real-time ad
justment w ithin the sem i - i ndependent streams.
Greedy B ureaucrat (GREED) - The most dominant budget theory from the
publ ic cho ice, l iterature. the Greedy Bureaucrat theory holds that (top ranked)

bureaucrats are uti l ity-maximizing ind iv iduals using the ir p u b l ic roles for the
88
purpose of achieving their ut i l ity maximization purpose.
Bureaucrats have
the advantage of asymmetric information with regard to how much resource i s
needed to achieve t h e outcomes desired b y p o l it ical dec ision makers and they

are monopoly sel lers of the ir service, so they are in an exc e llent posit ion to

overcharge. Their o n ly d ifficulty is that the overcharge cannot be realized in

the form of profit, so instead it is realized in the form of prerequ is ites of o f
fice, generally higher salary. status and benefits assoc iated with larger, that is

more expensive, organizat ions.
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